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New European CommissionSearch and Rescue Family reunion after Brexit
The Special Focus of this Policy Update discusses 
recent attempts to establish a predictable 
disembarkation and relocation mechanism for the 
Central Mediterranean. Following a series of 
incidents where search and rescue vessels were 
denied safe harbour, a change of government in Italy 
created a window of opportunity to secure access to 
ports and implement greater solidarity between 
member states. 
This policy update also looks into the composition of 
the new European Commission following Ursula von 
der Leyen’s election as President. The designated 
Home Affairs Commissioner Ylva Johansson was put 
in charge of developing the New Pact on Migration 
and Asylum, in close collaboration with Vice 
President (VP) Margaritis Schinas. Questions have 
been raised on the exact scope of proposed changes 
in migration and asylum policies.
As outlined in the Political Developments section, political 
tensions between Turkey and EU member states are rising. 
At the same time, the number of arrivals to the Greek 
islands and Cyprus is increasing. This has put further 
pressure on reception centres and has worsened living 
conditions for asylum seekers in the region.
In the meantime, violence and pushbacks in the Balkans 
and Eastern Europe also continue uninterrupted. Following 
an unexpected admission by the Croatian President that 
Croatian border police uses violence when carrying out 
pushbacks, civil society organisations have repeated calls 
for a comprehensive revision of border policies.
In the Closer Look section, Safe Passage presents their 
efforts in reuniting unaccompanied children with their 
families based in the UK. The organisation urges the UK 
government to keep this vital route open, even in the case of 
no-deal Brexit. 
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 SPECIAL FOCUS 
  A turning point for Search and Rescue? ​.  
 ​  Asylum ​.   
Search and rescue (SAR) operations in the EU have been faced with a growing number of                               
obstacles. Previous ​EPIM ​Updates have covered the criminalisation of solidarity, the denial                       
of safe harbour to rescue vessels, and the scaling down of EU coast guard operations. The                               
consequences, including several ​deadly ​shipwrecks​, continued to meet widespread                 
condemnation from ​member states​, ​NGOs and ​MEPs​. The first part of this Special Focus                           
discusses the SAR incidents that have taken place since July 2019. The second analyses the                             
recent ​change of government in Italy and its implications for the future of SAR. A final                               
section discusses recent efforts to establish a temporary disembarkation  mechanism. 
The absence of a concrete mechanism for disembarkation and relocation was deeply felt                         
over this summer. In early August, the Italian government entrenched its hostility to SAR                           
as it passed a highly criticised ​security bill​. This built on an ​earlier bill passed last                               
December that fined captains of migrant rescue vessels up to €50,000 if they entered Italian                             
ports without permission. The ​new bill increased the fine to range from €150,000 up to €1                               
1 
 
million, and ships would be automatically seized. In this context, several rescue vessels                         
spent weeks waiting for a safe harbour with hundreds of migrants on board as member                             
states negotiated their fate. These included the ​Gregoretti​, ​Alan Kurdi​, ​Open Arms​, ​Ocean                         
Viking​, ​Eleonore​, and ​Mare Jonio​. These ships were barred from entering Italy and, with the                             
exception​ of some people rescued in Maltese waters, also denied access to Malta. 
Delays of up to 19 days at sea continued even after other ​EU countries had committed to                                 
relocate the rescued migrants. ​SAR NGOs condemned the ​cruelty of prolonging their stay at                           
sea until the situation became critical, as crews reported that migrants were suffering                         
panic attacks​, going on ​hunger strikes and jumping ​off board​. Furthermore, these delays                         
prevented the ships from conducting further SAR operations where they were most needed.                         
NGOs​ warned that this was an “attempt to eliminate the presence of civil society at sea”. 
The situations of these vessels were resolved in different ways. Some required the                         
intervention of Italian courts, or involved a ​ship ​defying the new bill and subsequently                           
being fined and seized. In others, national authorities allowed migrants to disembark after                         
assurances that other countries would take responsibility, or ​gradually following a series                       
of ​medical emergencies​. Specifically, people on board the ​Gregoretti​, ​Open Arms​, ​Ocean                       
Viking and ​Alan Kurdi were relocated to France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal,                       
Romania and Spain. All the while as SAR vessels were blocked a few hundred miles from                               
shore, ​migrants continued to ​arrive in Italy autonomously in smaller boats. In fact, only                           
around ​9% of those who arrived in Italy by sea in the past year were rescued by NGOs. This                                     
highlights the ​weakness of the ​argument that SAR NGOs act as a pull factor, and shows the                                 
limitations of relocation initiatives, which would exclude all people arriving autonomously. 
Other questions linked to relocation remained unsolved. The mechanics by which rescued                       
asylum seekers are distributed between member states remain non-transparent and ad                     
hoc. In the incidents described above, the countries involved varied in each case. It is                             
unclear how the ​distribution of rescued migrants between them was decided, including                       
whether criteria such as existing family ties were being considered. Furthermore, in some                         
cases, relocation commitments were ​not fulfilled​; in others, they were not as swift ​as                           
promised​. For example, migrants who disembarked in Malta spent weeks in ​detention​, on                         
the pretext of medical checks, as they awaited relocation. These migrants staged ​protests                         
calling for freedom and ​clarity about their future, while ​NGOs argued that their detention                           
was unlawful. The fate of rescued migrants following relocation was also uncertain. For                         
example, whereas Spain had granted a ​45-day right to remain for the 629 people rescued by                               
the Aquarius in June 2018 so that they could apply for asylum, the 15 people received from                                 
the Open Arms in August 2019 were given only ​one week​. Therefore, existing approaches to                             
disembarkation and relocation remain far from a​ ​sustainable solution​. 
The ​collapse of the Italian government on 20 August created a window of opportunity to                             
address these challenges. Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte successfully formed a ​new                     
coalition with the centre-left Partito Democratico, excluding Matteo Salvini’s Lega Nord.                     
Luciana Lamorgese, previously a high-ranking civil servant in the Interior Ministry, was                       
appointed ​Interior Minister​, thus replacing Salvini. After this change of government,                     
speculation​ ​followed​ over a possible shift in Italy’s stance on SAR and disembarkation. 
Shortly after Conte’s second cabinet was sworn in, the Ocean Viking requested access to                           
safe harbour in Italy and Malta. It was allowed to disembark in Italy twice, with ​82 rescued                                 
people in the first case and ​182 in the second. Another ​35 disembarked in Malta. However, in                                 
both cases, rescued migrants were only given access to safe harbour after ​six days​, and not                               
before other member states ​commit​ted to relocate them. While this is an improvement upon                           
the previous government’s absolute closed-ports policy, the current approach retains                   
many risks and uncertainties for those rescued. ​Commentators have suggested that fully                       
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reversing Salvini’s policies may take time given the fragility of the governing coalition. This                           
cautious approach may also be part of an Italian ​move to secure greater commitments on                             
solidarity mechanisms. In his first days back in office, ​Conte signalled his willingness to                           
improve his relationships at EU level. After meeting with Conte shortly afterwards, French                         
President​ ​Emmanuel Macron​ called for greater solidarity with Italy. 
In this context, informal discussions on a predictable mechanism to disembark and                       
distribute migrants rescued at sea were held over the summer. ​NGOs had increasingly                         
called for such a mechanism over the ​past ​months​. The interior ministers of several                           
member states met in ​Helsinki on 18 July and in ​Paris on 22 July, under Franco-German                               
impetus. The ​Commission was present in a coordinating role. Following these meetings, a                         
provisional agreement between France, Germany, Finland, Luxembourg, Portugal,               
Lithuania, Croatia and Ireland was reached. Six more states backed the agreement in                         
principle, arriving at a ​total of 14​. According to a ​leaked draft of the agreement, states                               
committed to contributing to the reception of asylum seekers rescued by private rescue                         
vessels, which were to disembark in the closest safe harbour. The agreement remained                         
provisional ahead of a planned meeting in Malta in September, and was met with ​mixed                             
reactions​. ​UNHCR and IOM praised states for stepping forward. Other commentators saw it                         
as a ​repetition of previously failed plans, however, and ​warned against making rescue and                           
disembarkation obligations conditional on other states shouldering responsibility. 
The ​Italian government​, which at the time still included Salvini, originally refused to join                           
these meetings. However, after its change of government, it participated in a ​meeting on 23                             
September in Malta where a new agreement for a predictive disembarkation and relocation                         
mechanism was found between Malta, Italy, Germany and France. According to the leaked                         
Joint Declaration of Intent​, the participating states would allow people rescued by private                         
vessels to have access to a safe port, which may be rotated on a ​voluntary basis. Following                                 
disembarkation, participating states would relocate the individuals rescued based on                   
pre-declared pledges and within a period of four weeks. The relocations would be                         
coordinated by the Commission. Rescued migrants would become subject to fast-tracked                     
asylum and, if applicable, return procedures. Crucially, this mechanism would only apply                       
to private rescue vessels. Arrival states would remain responsible for individuals rescued                       
by their own state-run operations as well as for people arriving autonomously. The                         
programme would function as a pilot for a minimum of six months. However, it may be                               
suspended if the number of arrivals rises substantially in the meantime. States could also                           
cease participation in the event of “disproportionate migratory pressure”, although few                     
details are available as to how this would be determined. 
Although ​progress in forging this agreement was welcomed, ​many ​commentators also                     
urged ​caution​. The voluntary rotation of ports could leave room for continued stand-offs                         
that would unnecessarily delay the disembarkation of rescued migrants. This could create                       
unnecessary risks on board and lead to a longer absence of rescue capacities. A further                             
point of concern was the Declaration’s approach to Libya. For instance, the Declaration                         
stated that rescue vessels would be required to not obstruct operations by the Libyan Coast                             
Guard, and would need to comply with instructions by the relevant Maritime Rescue                         
Coordination Centre. This could entail returning migrants rescued in Libyan waters to                       
Libya, which ​UNHCR deems unsafe. In a ​joint statement​, SAR NGOs operating in the                           
Mediterranean called for a bolder mechanism. Among others, they advocated for reviewing                       
the engagement with the Libyan Coast Guard, sanctions for non-adhering countries, a                       
greater voice for cities, and less discretion to member states to suspend the mechanism. 
In addition, several implications of the agreement remain unclear. First, there is little detail                           
on what the streamlined asylum and return procedures would entail, and whether they                         
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would comply with international law and minimum procedural safeguards. Second, the                     
relocation process remains non-transparent, including whether individual connections               
and vulnerabilities would be taken into account. Third, the mechanism’s implications for                       
the much-needed Dublin reform are also uncertain. On the one hand, the move was widely                             
praised by certain political actors as a ​gesture of solidarity that could serve as a ​blueprint                               
for further redistribution, thus perhaps unlocking compromise on Dublin. On the other                       
hand, ​scholars have warned that allowing states to pick and choose when to implement                           
solidarity measures is​ ​backwards step​ for EU migration policy. 
The agreement was presented at the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council meeting on 8                             
October, in order to determine a list of safe ports for disembarkation, secure other states’                             
voluntary participation and establish specific relocation pledges. It was made clear from                       
the ​outset that success would ​depend on widespread endorsement. However, only ​three                       
more countries have confirmed their support to date, namely Ireland, Luxembourg and                       
Portugal. Others, including Sweden, Finland and Slovenia, were ​reportedly favourable but                     
undecided. States that have traditionally rejected responsibility-sharing mechanisms,               
including the Visegrad Four, remained ​opposed​. At the same time, the deal was also                           
rejected by other states on the EU external border. Cyprus, Greece and Bulgaria called for                             
greater focus and resources for the ​Eastern Mediterranean​. As discussed in later sections,                         
this route has recently seen a considerable increase in arrivals. ​Spain​, in turn, welcomed                           
the pilot project but will not participate in relocations. It has ​repeatedly argued that                           
solutions must apply to the entire Mediterranean, not only Italy and Malta, and ​opposed                           
the differentiation between migrants rescued by NGOs or by its state-led SAR operation,                         
Salvamento Marítimo. Nevertheless, as noted by ​ECRE​, even if several member states do not                           
join this mechanism, their willingness to participate in relocations over the past months is                           
important progress.  
Given this lukewarm response, the future of the deal remains uncertain. ​Discussions will                         
continue over the coming weeks, with the exact number of participating states and their                           
relocation commitments yet to be determined. The collapse of the agreement also remains a                           
possibility. This would have widespread implications, among others, for the credibility of                       
the new coalition in Italy, the future of Dublin reform, or the​ ​mandate​ of​ ​Operation Sophia​. 
 POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS 
  The new European Commission takes shape​. 
 ​  Asylum ​.   
Following the ​May elections of the European Parliament, the new European Commission                       
started taking shape. After a period of ​uncertainty​, the European Council unexpectedly                       
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proposed Ursula von der Leyen as ​Commission President​. ​Commentators argued that von                       
der Leyen, formerly the German Minister for Defence, is “far from being a bad choice.”                             
However, ahead of her ​confirmation vote​, ​MEPs expressed criticism about the lack of                         
concrete policy proposals that von der Leyen wished to advance, including in ​migration                         
matters​. In ​response​, during her ​confirmation speech​, von der Leyen unveiled an ​ambitious                         
action plan which included a “​New Pact on Migration and Asylum​”. The Pact will be geared                               
towards addressing a ​comprehensive set of priorities and long-standing issues, including                     
the expansion of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, ​the restoration of the                           
Schengen Area and the relaunch of the Dublin reform. It is open to question, however, how                               
this agenda will be implemented and what the exact scope of the proposed changes will be. 
Von der Leyen designated the Swedish candidate Ylva Johansson for the Commissioner                       
portfolio of ​Home Affairs​. Johansson was nominated by the Swedish centre-left ​Social                       
Democratic Party​. Prior to her designation, she was ​Minister for Employment and                       
Integration in Sweden. The Scandinavian country remains one of the most ​welcoming for                         
migrants in Europe. Her party affiliation and ​experience at the national level could be of                             
help in carrying out the mission assigned to her. However, ​observers have also noted a                             
recent ​restrictive turn in Swedish immigration policy. This shift is sometimes understood                       
as a reaction to the rise of the right-wing ​Swedish Democrats​, which capitalised on the                             
increased political salience of immigration. Ahead of the 2018 national elections, Johansson                       
proposed the attendance of language classes as a ​precondition for immigrants obtaining                       
work and welfare benefits. Johansson and the ​Social Democrats also vowed to make it                           
impossible for people not residing in Sweden to compete for positions where there is no                             
labour shortage. 
Following the ​favourable vote by the Parliament’s LIBE Committee, Johansson has been                       
entrusted with developing the ​New Pact on Migration and Asylum​. However, in her                         
challenging ​confirmation hearing​, she struggled to clarify how she exactly intends to do                         
this. On the one hand, she said that “​failure is not an option​”. On the other hand, when                                   
asked how to unlock the process of reforms, she replied that “I can’t say exactly how this                                 
will be done”. ​MEPs also expressed frustration over her evasive answers on whether she                           
would support using qualified majority voting to overcome divisions within the Council. In                         
line with her ​initial written answers​, the Commissioner-designate emphasised furthering                   
dialogue with the member states before advancing new policies and initiatives. She also                         
announced that she would make no concrete proposals in relation to the EU’s ​asylum                           
reforms in the first ​hundred days of her office. ​After the hearing​, Johansson was asked to                               
submit further ​written clarifications​, which led her to take a more assertive stance. She                           
wrote to MEPs that she “will press to set up humanitarian corridors” from third countries                             
and that she “will push for the swift adoption of a new Resettlement Framework”. As part of                                 
the future Pact, her focus will also be on increased return rates, although this raises                             
concerns about how to effectively protect against the​ ​risk of refoulement​.  
In developing migration and asylum policies and reforms, Johansson will work in close                         
cooperation with the Greek ​centre-right candidate ​Margaritis Schinas​, VP-designate for                   
“​Protecting our European Way of Life​”. The wording of the portfolio attracted widespread                         
criticism for suggesting that migrants pose a threat to European values. Before Schinas’                         
confirmation hearing​, ​commentators and ​NGOs expressed concerns that European                 
institutions are mainstreaming the fear mongering ​rhetoric of the radical right. ​NGOs also                         
urged the Commission to be culturally and ethnically inclusive. While von der Leyen                         
defended her choice in an ​opinion piece by stating that extremists should not have a                             
monopoly over the language of values and identity, leaders of the populist right celebrated                           
the chosen title as an “​ideological victory​”. At his audience with LIBE, Schinas stood behind                             
the title, arguing that it refers to the values of inclusion and diversity. At the same time, he                                   
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deftly acknowledged opposing views. ​MEPs responded that the title is inherently divisive                       
and that the Commission should invest in a constructive dialogue with progressive forces                         
in the Parliament. Although a large majority in LIBE confirmed Schinas after his ​good                           
performance​ at the hearing, the controversy may still lead to a change to the title. 
Questions were also raised about Schinas' ​actual powers​. Von der Leyen restructured her                         
College to dismantle ​hierarchies and minimise ​frictions​, but the new ​organisational chart                       
also creates some ​confusion​. As other VPs, Schinas will work closely with the                         
Secretariat-General to ensure that actions and policies conform to von der Leyen’s ​agenda​.                         
However, under the new power ​structure​, only ​Executive VPs – which Schinas is not – have                               
direct authority over Directorate-Generals. This may make ​conflicts between Schinas and                     
the Commissioner more likely. This issue also intersects with the lack of a clear                           
demarcation of tasks. Schinas will coordinate Johansson’s initiatives but also those of                       
other Commissioners, as long as they relate to migration and security. For instance,                         
Commissioner-designate for International Partnerships, ​Jutta Urpilainen​, was tasked with                 
strengthening partnerships with countries of origin and transit. However, ​foreign policy                     
falls under the responsibility of ​Josep Borrell​, the appointed VP and High Representative.                         
The horizontal structure and overlapping portfolios may increase collisions between line                     
Commissioners and VPs, rather than reducing them. 
The ​European Parliament was expected to vote on the new Commission as a whole on 23                               
October. Due to the rejections of ​several candidates for a Commissioner’s post, however,                         
additional hearings will have to take place. It is therefore likely that the ​final vote will be                                 
delayed. This may make it ​impossible for the new College of Commissioners to take up its                               
responsibilities on 1 November, as previously announced. 
 
  Developments in the Eastern Med​. 
 ​  Asylum ​.​  ​  Children and Youth ​.  
Over the summer, pressure has mounted regarding the migration situation in the Eastern                         
Mediterranean, particularly in Cyprus and Greece. This section studies the developments in                       
those states before linking them to the rise in their geopolitical tensions with Turkey.                           
Cyprus has experienced a surge in the ​number of refugees over the last two years, leading                               
to the asylum system and reception camps becoming increasingly overburdened.                   
According to Cypriot government figures, the country has received ​4,500 new applications                       
during the first four months of this year. More generally, the country has seen a 69%                               
increase in asylum applications between 2017 and 2018. Cypriot politicians have observed                       
that Turkey is letting asylum seekers ​cross the porous border on the island from the                             
Turkish to the Cypriot side. In fact, the majority of arrivals are reportedly coming via this                               
land route. Others have pointed to the particular rise in the ​arrivals of Afghan asylum                             
seekers who are leaving Turkey due to their insecure status there. 
In response to this increase in numbers, ​Cypriot authorities established a new                       
International Protection Administrative Court in June tasked with tackling a backlog of                       
more than 14,000 asylum applications. In the meantime, the Cypriot Interior Minister                       
Constantinos Petrides also sent a ​letter to the European Commission urging member states                         
to take on 5,000 refugees from Cyprus. In response, the current Commissioner for Migration                           
Dimitris Avramopoulos stated that the Commission would lend operational and financial                     
support to “the implementation of potential voluntary relocation of asylum seekers”.                     
However, in the absence of a functioning EU-wide relocation mechanism, it is questionable                         
to what extent this will actually be put into practice (see Special Focus). In mid-September,                             
Cyprus also signed a ​hosting agreement with the European Asylum Support Office (EASO).                         
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This agreement tasks EASO with supporting Cypriot authorities with the registration of                       
asylum applications and improving the conditions of the accommodation centre in Kofinou                       
and the newly established first reception centre in Kokkinotrimithia. 
NGOs have criticised the Cypriot government of running a malfunctioning asylum system.                       
Reports show that some asylum seekers are stuck in the process for up to a decade. Other                                 
points of criticism include the failure of the Cypriot government to comply with the ​Asylum                             
Procedures Directive fully, and specifically the absence of adequate legal assistance during                       
the asylum process.  
Greece is facing similar issues. Recent months have seen the biggest ​increase in the arrivals                             
of refugees to its islands since 2015. In August, close to 10,000 people reached the country by                                 
land and sea, and more than 12,000 arrived in September. This has made reception centres                             
even more ​overcrowded and unsafe. The Moria camp on the island of Lesbos alone houses                             
over 12,000 ​individuals​, running at four times its intended capacity. There have been                         
reports of ​tear gas use by police forces against minors protesting to be transferred out of                               
the camp. In August, an Afghan ​teenager was fatally stabbed in a violent ​altercation​. The                             
lethal incident has prompted ​UN agencies to renew their calls for the ​transfer of                           
unaccompanied children to safe accommodation. At the end of September, at least two                         
persons died as a result of a ​fire in the camp, prompting protests by camp residents to                                 
which the police responded with more tear gas use. In response, ​Amnesty International                         
accused the Greek government and the EU of an abject failure to protect refugees. The                             
International Rescue Committee and ​UNHCR called for the immediate evacuation of all                       
vulnerable people to safe accommodation on the mainland and in other EU member states.                           
Médecins Sans Frontières has accused Greek and EU authorities of deliberately ​neglecting                       
those held on the islands, especially vulnerable individuals such as children. Several other                         
NGOs have continued to condemn the ​mistreatment of asylum seekers in Greece and the                           
substandard​ ​conditions​ in reception centres on the Greek islands. 
In ​response to the dire situation, the new conservative ​Greek government announced                       
emergency ​measures at the end of August. Consequently, around 1,500 ​individuals were                       
transferred out of Moria to camps in Northern Greece at the beginning of September.                           
However, one of the camps, Nea Kavala, has also been subjected to ​criticism for its lack of                                 
adequate infrastructure and healthcare. Amid ongoing ​transfers from the islands, more                     
plans have been reported for the relocation of another 3,000 asylum seekers to the                           
mainland by the end of October. The government also pledged to strengthen ​border                         
controls together with Frontex and speed up ​return operations of migrants to Turkey. It                           
also called on EU member states to establish a ​redistribution mechanism ​and provide more                           
financial ​support to Turkey. Furthermore, the government planned to abolish the second                       
stage of the right to appeal a rejected asylum application. This move, which was intended                             
to ​shorten the country’s lengthy asylum processes, was heavily criticised by ​civil society                         
organisations​. The Greek ​Union of Administrative Judges also called on the Greek                       
government to uphold its ​obligations under international law. According to recent media                       
reports, the government has now​ ​abandoned​ the proposal. 
One month later, at the end of September, and following the fire in the Moria camp, the                                 
Greek ​government announced a further ​set of ​measures​. These include a plan to return                           
10,000 migrants to Turkey by the end of next year. In addition, the ​government seeks to                               
install more naval patrols in the Aegean Sea and close off reception centres to migrants                             
whose asylum applications were rejected. Instead, these people would be housed in “​closed                         
centres​”. A turn towards more restrictive policies is also evident in a surge of ​arrests of                               
migrants without residence permits and in recent ​crackdowns on refugee communities in                       
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Athens. ​Human Rights Watch has reacted with concern to these new policies and warned                           
against a wave of human rights violations. 
Observers have linked the rise in arrivals to ​Cyprus ​and ​Greece to recent geopolitical                           
tensions with Turkey, including in the context of the EU-Turkey Deal which has been                           
criticised extensively by NGOs. At the end of July, the ​Commission adopted new assistance                           
measures for the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey. Shortly after, however, Turkey                         
announced that it would ​suspend the readmission agreement as it accused the EU of not                             
fulfilling its promise of visa liberalisations for its citizens. In early September, tensions rose                           
again when Turkish President ​Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated that his country did not receive                           
sufficient support from its EU counterparts for refugees hosted in Turkey, and therefore                         
considered allowing them to travel onward to Europe. The Turkish government has also                         
repeatedly called on the EU to help create so-called “safe zones” at the Turkish-Syrian                           
border, to which Syrian refugees could be returned or to which they could flee from Syria.                               
This proposal, however, was rejected by EU ​counterparts​. EU states also raised ​concerns                         
that a Turkish military operation into Kurdish regions in North Syria, starting in                         
mid-October, could lead to increased numbers of​ ​refugees​ fleeing from the region. 
In addition, Greek Prime Minister, ​Kyriakos Mitsotakis​, warned Turkey not to use threats,                         
while Commissioner ​Avramopoulos stated that the deal was not to be used as a negotiating                             
tool. As arrivals of refugees to the Greek islands picked up in the following weeks, ​Turkey                               
has been accused of turning “a blind eye to smugglers” operating in the Aegean as a way to                                   
exert ​pressure on the EU. The Turkish ​government ​has denied these allegations and                         
asserted that its​ ​coastguard​ is still intercepting boats that attempt the crossing. 
  Violence and pushbacks at the Eastern border​. 
 ​  Asylum ​.   
Recurring reports of violent pushbacks along the ​Balkan route and in ​Eastern Europe                         
continue to draw attention to the unlawful treatment of asylum seekers. Collective                       
expulsions and summary returns have the effect of preventing asylum seekers from                       
making an application for protection and are considered ​illegal under the Refugee                       
Convention and EU law. Nevertheless, for a number of years, the ​media​, ​NGOs​, ​Council of                             
Europe and ​UNHCR have documented the widespread use of summary returns and the                         
systematic violence wielded by border officials in the region. NGOs suspect that the                         
involvement of border officials and their systematic use of violence indicate that                       
governments are deliberately using pushbacks as a ​deterrence strategy​. Researchers have                     
shown that such ​unlawful practices take place even though the number of persons using                           
the Balkan route has significantly decreased over the years. The ​situation could worsen                         
should the number of arrivals rise due to the  ​growing tensions​ with Turkey. 
In 2018 and 2019, reports of ​institutional violence led to ​several investigations by national                           
ombudsman’s offices. Following its review of cases of ​accusations of the Slovenian police                         
‘handing over’ migrants to Croatian authorities, the Slovenian Ombudsman issued a                     
statement in February. The statement does not shed full light on whether the actions taken                             
by the Slovenian police made it impossible for asylum seekers to apply for international                           
protection. However, the public office urged the border police to not remove individuals                         
without giving them unhindered access to international protection. In addition, it                     
underlined that police officers should take all necessary measures to ensure full respect for                           
human rights. How effective the actions and recommendations of Ombudsmen will be is                         
open to question. Moreover, ​government officials across the region continue to reject                       
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accusations of summary returns and violence. For example, the ​Croatian Ombudswoman                     
has been refused access to official records and documentation. 
A turning point with international consequences was noticed in July when ​Croatian                       
President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović admitted that Croatian authorities were responsible                 
for the collective expulsion of migrants at the border with Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the                             
same ​interview​, she also acknowledged that border guards had been using force when                         
doing pushbacks. In the aftermath of this admission, ​NGOs have called on all authorities to                             
stop forcible pushbacks and to hold those responsible accountable. ​NGOs have also called                         
on EU institutions to express an unambiguous condemnation of unlawful border practices. 
Protracted border violence also casts doubt on the capacity of ​Frontex to effectively monitor                           
and prevent human rights violations. Under its “​Code of Conduct​”, Frontex must ensure that                           
any person participating in activities which it coordinates or leads complies with human                         
rights law. In the past, ​NGOs expressed fears that the border agency preferred to turn a                               
blind eye to abuses at the EU external borders. Furthermore, although ​Frontex has publicly                           
condemned unprocessed returns, new journalistic ​investigations and recent NGO ​reports                   
denounce the Agency’s personnel for not only tolerating violent pushbacks but also being                         
actively involved in unlawful practices like the apprehension, detention and forced                     
expulsion of migrants, particularly in Greece, Bulgaria and Hungary.  
In addition to pushbacks and border violence, NGOs have also reported an increase in the                             
policing of their activities. These include ​acts of intimidation and criminalisation against                       
activists who assist migrants in gaining asylum and protection and those who document                         
abuse and pushback operations. While the ​Council of Europe reminded its members of the                           
need to promote spaces for the activities of NGOs in November 2018, rhetorical attacks and                             
systematic criminal proceedings against activists are creating a diffused climate of                     
hostility that undermines the foundations of​ ​liberal democracies​. 
An opportunity to move towards restoring adherence to European ​founding values may be                         
found in the infringement procedure against ​Hungary in relation to its treatment of                         
asylum seekers in transit zones and its criminalisation of humanitarian activities. The                       
Commission decided to carry this action forward in July 2019. In the Commission’s view, the                             
Hungarian “Stop Soros” legislation unlawfully curtails the right to asylum by making it                         
impossible for asylum applicants to be assisted by humanitarian organisations. Some                     
experts have raised concerns over the actual impact of a condemnation, fearing delays in                           
the procedure and a lack of enforcement capacity. ​Amnesty International​, however, stated                       
that the procedure at least “exposes the appalling treatment the authorities use to deter                           
migrants and refugees from seeking safety in Hungary”. 
  A surge in Channel crossings​. 
 ​  Asylum ​.​  ​  Children and Youth ​.  
August and September 2019 saw a sharp surge in attempts to cross the English Channel by                               
sea. About ​1,500 people have attempted to cross so far this year, compared to ​539 in all of                                   
2018, with ​record numbers in the late summer. An ​Iranian ​woman and an ​Iraqi man were                               
the first known migrants who died attempting to cross the Channel. In response, UK Prime                             
Minister ​Boris Johnson warned migrants not to cross the Channel, stating, “we will send                           
you back”. ​NGOs and members of the ​political opposition labelled these statements as                         
dehumanising, inflammatory and misleading. The UK and France agreed to ​strengthen                     
cooperation​, possibly including more funding to reinforce France’s patrol efforts. This                     
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follows an earlier ​joint action plan on border management between the two countries, as                           
discussed in a previous​ ​EPIM Policy Update​. 
NGOs operating in Calais and Dunkirk have ​warned for ​months​, if not ​years​, that the                             
increasing hostility and harassment of migrants in the area by the French police is both                             
cruel and counterproductive. The renewed crackdown has pushed people in already                     
precarious situations to ​take greater risks and travel to the UK, despite the ​unsafe                           
conditions of the journey. In particular, attempts to cross the Channel were believed to be                             
driven by ​imminent evictions​. In September, over ​700 people were forcefully cleared from                         
makeshift camps and a sports hall that had been providing shelter. This amounted to the                             
largest eviction in over a year.  
Another factor contributing to the rise in crossings may be the expected Brexit deadline on                             
31 October, which is leading to fears about tightened border controls. Children, who are                           
already highly vulnerable and have ​insufficient protection in northern France, could see                       
their rights and asylum prospects particularly affected ​post-Brexit​. As discussed in the                       
Closer Look section, a no-deal Brexit could lead to the end of ​family reunification                           
mechanisms for asylum seekers, which are currently in place under the Dublin Regulation.                         
In the UK, the EU Home Affairs ​Sub-Committee called on the UK to establish an interim                               
agreement to protect the rights of asylum seekers, particularly unaccompanied minors,                     
echoing other calls from civil society for more​ ​legal pathways​ into the UK. 
  Shifting responsibilities in the Western Med​. 
 ​  Asylum ​.   
Although most attention this summer centred on developments in the Central                     
Mediterranean, the only SAR operation in the Mediterranean Sea that is managed by an EU                             
member state – Spain’s Salvamento Marítimo – was also facing important changes. The                         
agency is being gradually stripped of ​staff and ​resources​, particularly in the ​areas with the                             
greatest number of crossings. In addition, in the past few months, there has been a                             
noticeable shift in its operations. Salvamento Marítimo’s ​new policy ​reportedly involves                     
conducting SAR operations ​only in Spanish and shared SAR zones, effectively ceding more                         
ground to Moroccan authorities. By contrast, ​one third of the 50,000 people Spanish                         
authorities rescued in 2018 were rescued in Moroccan waters, with the government’s                       
authorisation. Meanwhile, spokespeople from the agency’s ​staff union state that Moroccan                     
authorities have also started operating within Spanish SAR areas. 
The ​Spanish Commission for Refugees and ​local NGOs have denounced the reliance on                         
Morocco as irresponsible, stating that it may contribute to a ​rise in ​avoidable ​deaths​.                           
Moroccan authorities are poorly funded and have much larger delays in responding to                         
reports of ships in danger. Furthermore, reports suggest that migrants are now taking                         
greater risks to avoid being intercepted by Moroccan authorities. Fearing that they will be                           
immediately sent back, smugglers are ​reportedly waiting much longer to warn Salvamento                       
Marítimo when migrants attempt a crossing. 
These developments also take place against the background of growing cooperation                     
between Spain and Morocco to ​reduce arrivals to Spain by 50%. In July 2019, Spain                             
allocated ​€30 million to strengthen Morocco’s border management capabilities, on top of                       
another ​€140 million that the EU committed in December 2018. However, other aspects of                           
this cooperation are also placing migrants at risk. These include ​violent raids by the                           
Moroccan police against migrants near the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, and the                           
continued​ practice of pushbacks by Spain. 
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 SELECTED ECJ CASE LAW & LEGAL ACTIONS 
  
 ​  Asylum ​.​  ​ ​  Mobile EU citizens​ . 
Case​ ​C-94/18​, Nalini Chenchooliah v Minister for Justice and Equality 
This case concerned the situation of Ms Nalini Chenchooliah, a Mauritian national, who met                           
and married a Portuguese national while lawfully residing in Ireland. After her marriage,                         
she applied for a residence permit as the spouse of a Union citizen on the basis of the EU                                     
Citizens’ Rights Directive (2004/38/EC), Article 7. This Article governs the rights of EU                         
citizens and their family members to reside in another member state for periods of over                             
three months. Her application was refused, however, as she had failed to show that her                             
spouse was involved in economic activity, as required under that Article. Several years                         
later, and following Ms Chenchooliah’s ​declaration ​that her spouse had returned to                       
Portugal, a deportation order was issued against her. This deportation order, following Irish                         
law, would remain in force indefinitely. In effect, this amounted to an entry ban. Following                             
an appeal by Ms Chenchooliah, several questions were raised on whether her situation was                           
covered by EU law and, if so, how the rights she derived from EU law applied to the                                   
circumstances at hand. The CJEU started by observing that even if Ms Chenchooliah had                           
failed to obtain a right of residence for more than three months, she had nevertheless been                               
covered by the right of EU citizens and their family members to reside in another member                               
state for a period up to three months (Article 6). As the Court continued, given that she had                                   
in the past enjoyed a temporary right of residence under EU free movement law, an                             
expulsion decision against her continued to fall within the scope of that law. This meant that                               
that decision had to meet the procedural safeguards of the Directive, including in relation to                             
judicial redress, and that, in any case, an entry ban could not be imposed on her. 
Case​ ​C‑93/18​ Bajratari v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2 October 
This case concerned the residence rights of Mr and Mrs Bajratari, who are Albanian                           
nationals living in Northern Ireland with their children. Mrs Bajratari had applied for a                           
residence card under the ​Citizens’ Rights Directive (2004/38/EC). She based her application                       
on her role as the primary carer of her two children, who are Irish nationals. In order to                                   
derive a right of residence, she first had to prove that her children had sufficient resources                               
not to become a burden on the host member state. The family was supported by Mr                               
Bajratari’s earnings. However, he was working despite his residence card and work permit                         
having expired. The Home Office rejected Mrs Bajratari’s request, arguing that unlawful                       
income should not be considered when assessing her children’s self-sufficiency. The question                       
before the CJEU was whether a child can be considered self-sufficient if they are only                             
supported by the earnings of a parent who is working unlawfully. The CJEU had previously                             
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held in Case C-200/02 ​Zhu & Chen that the conditions for self-sufficiency are met whenever                             
the child has access to sufficient resources, regardless of their origin. However, the Court                           
had not specifically ruled on situations where the income was unlawfully obtained. The                         
Court conceded that resources made available by a parent who works unlawfully would be                           
more precarious due to the unlawful nature of his or her residence. However, the Court                             
considered, first, that the restriction on the sources of self-sufficiency could not be derived                           
from the wording of the Directive. Second, it held that it would constitute a disproportionate                             
interference with the EU citizen minor’s right of residence. The Court also highlighted that                           
Mr Bajratari had been paying tax and social security contributions even while being                         
unlawfully employed and that the family had not received any social assistance over the                           
past decade. As such, refusing to recognise his earnings would go manifestly beyond what is                             
necessary to protect the member state’s resources. Finally, the UK government had referred                         
to public policy grounds to restrict the family’s free movement rights. However, the Court                           
found that Mr Bajratari’s unlawful employment did not amount to a genuine and serious                           
threat, and so the conditions to invoke these grounds did not apply.  
Other relevant case law 
Case ​C-410/18​ Aubriet v Minister for Higher Education and Research of Luxembourg, 10 July 
Case​ ​C‑89/18​ A v Udlændinge- og Integrationsministeriet, 10 July 
Case​ ​C-556/17​ Alekszij Torubarov v Bevándorlási és Menekültügyi Hivatal, 29 July  
Case​ ​C-544/18​ Henrika Dakneviciute v The Commissioners for HMRC, 19 September 
Case ​C-70/18​ Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid v A, B, P, 3 October 
Case ​C-302/18​ X v Belgische Staat, 3 October 
 A CLOSER LOOK FROM... 
  ​Safe Passage ​. 
 ​  Asylum ​.​ ​ ​  Children and Youth ​.  
By Beth Gardiner-Smith, CEO of ​Safe Passage 
In 2015, a group of volunteer lawyers, faith leaders and activists formed Safe Passage,                           
determined to find a legal and safe way to reunite hundreds of unaccompanied children in                             
the ‘Calais Jungle’ with their families in the UK. In theory, the family reunion provisions of                               
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the Dublin Regulation were one of the few legal routes for such children to reach safety.                               
However, until then, these provisions had never been used to reunite a child in France with                               
their family in Britain. With the support of several legal partners, three children and one                             
vulnerable adult won a ​landmark ruling in January 2016 against the UK’s Home Office’s                           
refusal to admit them to join their family. The case opened up a safe and legal route for                                   
children seeking family reunion and laid the foundation for Safe Passage’s work. Just two                           
months later, the first unaccompanied minors travelled to the UK through the Dublin                         
Regulation’s family reunion provisions. 
Safe Passage continues to support cases directly; last year we supported 40% of successful                           
family reunification cases of unaccompanied children from France to the UK. We have                         
expanded our work to Greece and also support some of the first reunions of unaccompanied                             
minors from Italy. With the help of EPIM’s “​Never Alone​” programme, we now also provide                             
training and legal advice to other practitioners to build capacity across the system. We also                             
continue to use strategic litigation to improve the application of the Dublin Regulation. 
The family reunion provisions of the Dublin Regulation remain one of the few legal routes                             
for unaccompanied children. This is why this route to the UK must not close overnight in the                                 
event of a no-deal Brexit. In 2018, Safe Passage led a campaign that saw legislation passed to                                 
guarantee rights for unaccompanied children comparable to those of the Dublin Regulation                       
even after Britain’s departure from the EU. In the event of a no-deal scenario, this legislation                               
will not apply. ​Secondary legislation commits the UK to process Dublin applications it                         
receives by the date of exit. However, the UK has no legal obligation to accept children with a                                   
family claim where an application has not been received. Even for claims submitted within                           
time, there is no guarantee that the EU will cooperate to facilitate the transfers, nor any                               
clarity over the process for appealing against a rejection. 
While the UK’s domestic immigration laws include some provision for family reunion, these                         
fall far short of the rights enjoyed under the Dublin Regulation. Unless steps are taken by                               
both the UK government and EU to maintain family reunion to the Dublin standards, there is                               
a real risk that a no-deal Brexit will lead to children disappearing from the system. Without                               
further legal options, more children may attempt to make their own way via dangerous                           
routes such as the Channel crossing – a route which has already claimed the lives of at least                                   
six children since 2014. Safe Passage has launched an awareness-raising campaign amongst                       
partners and practitioners across Europe and is ​campaigning in the UK to secure a                           
guarantee that this vital legal route will not be closed down as a result of no-deal Brexit.                                 











 UNHCR statistics on arrivals​. 
  Asylum ​. 
Recent data by the UNHCR​ ​reveal​ the following trends: 
● 67,838 sea arrivals have been recorded since the beginning of the year. 7,923 have arrived in                               
Italy, while 38,123 have arrived in Greece and 19,413 have arrived in Spain; 
● So far, an estimated 1,071 people have been reported dead or missing in 2019; 
● In Italy, the majority of refugees come from Tunisia, Pakistan and Côte d’Ivoire, while more                             
than half of all refugees arriving in Greece originate from Afghanistan and Syria. In Spain,                             
the majority of refugees come from Morocco, Mali and Guinea. 
  Relevant reports​. 
  Asylum ​.​ ​  Inclusion ​.​ ​ ​  Children and Youth ​.  
UNHCR, Unicef and IOM: Access to education for refugee and migrant children in Europe 
This ​joint report discusses the situation of children with migrant backgrounds in Europe,                         
including their profiles, access to education, school attendance and learning outcomes. It                       
also highlights common challenges, promising practices and recommendations. 
Refugee Action and No Accommodation Network (NACCOM): Missing the Safety Net 
The situation of people who have been denied asylum in the UK but are unable to return to                                   
their countries of origin is highlighted in this ​report by Refugee Action and NACCOM. Their                             
data shows significant delays in the processing of applications for support. These delays,                         
during which people may lack access to basic necessities, have significant impacts on their                           
health and can lead to homelessness and destitution. 
  EU Funding opportunities​. 
  Asylum ​.​ ​ ​  Inclusion ​.​ ​ ​  Children and Youth ​.  
Calls for proposals - EU funding 
● AMIF-2019-AG-CALL-01​: Fostering the integration of persons in need of protection through                     
private sponsorship schemes. 
o​  ​ ​Call out on 30.07.2019 – Deadline: 30.01.2020 
● AMIF-2019-AG-Call-02​: Social orientation of newly arrived third-country nationals through                 
involvement of local communities, including mentoring and volunteering activities. 
o​  ​ ​Call out on 30.07.2019 – Deadline: 30.01.2020 
● AMIF-2019-AG-Call-03​: Social and economic integration of migrant women. 
o​  ​ ​Call out on 30.07.2019 – Deadline: 30.01.2020 
● AMIF-2019-AG-Call-04​: Awareness raising and information campaigns on the risks of                   
irregular migration in selected third countries and within Europe. 
o​  ​ ​Call out on 30.07.2019 – Deadline: 30.01.2020 
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● AMIF-2019-AG-Call-05​: Support to victims of trafficking in human beings. 
o​  ​ ​Call out on 30.07.2019 – Deadline: 30.01.2020 
● AMIF-2019-AG-Call-06​: Protection of children in migration. 
o​  ​ ​Call out on 30.07.2019 – Deadline: 30.01.2020 
● AMIF-2019-AG-Call-07​: Transnational projects by Member States for training of experts in                     
the area of asylum and immigration. 
o​  ​Call out on 30.07.2019 – Deadline: 30.01.2020 
 EU CALENDAR: UPCOMING EVENTS 
 












6-7, 11-12 & 21 November, 
2-3 & 9 December  LIBE Committee Meetings 
Other events 
  23 October 
Legal Migration Pathways to Europe for Low- and Middle-Skilled                 
Migrants​, Migration Policy Institute 
  23-24 October 
ECRE Annual General Conference​, ECRE 
  24-25 October 




Working together for Socio-economic Integration of Migrant             
Women: Final Conference for Smart Volunteering Project​,             
European Network of Migrant Women and Smart Volunteering  
 
21-22 November  Vienna Migration Conference 2019​, ICMPD 
 
This document provides a focused analysis of recent EU level policy-making, legislation and jurisprudence                           
relevant to EPIM’s sub-funds on (1) Immigration detention; (2) Reforming the European Asylum System;                           
(3) Children and Youth on the Move; (4) Mobile EU citizens and (5) Building Inclusive European Societies and                                 
covers the period from 4 July to 14 October 2019. We kindly ask the readers to keep in mind that the present                                           
Policy Update is composed of a selection of documents and does not claim to be exhaustive. 
Should you, as representatives from EPIM’s Partner Foundations or EPIM-supported organisations, have                       
questions related to the analysis provided in this document or on EU developments in the field of migration                                   
and integration in general, you are invited to contact the authors ( ​o.sundberg@epc.eu ​, ​ah.neidhardt@epc.eu ​,                         
k.bamberg@epc.eu ​, ​m.desomer@epc.eu ​). The sole responsibility for the content lies with the author(s) and the                           
content may not necessarily reflect the positions of EPIM, NEF or EPIM’s Partner Foundations. 
For more information on EPIM, please visit ​www.epim.info ​. 
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